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208 FARMLAND IRRIGATION CO. tI. DOPPLMAIER [48 C.2d 
[Sac. No. 6581. In Bank. Mar. 22, 1957.] 
FARMLAND IRRIGATION COMPANY, INC. (a Corpora-
tion), Respondent, v. GEORGE DOPPLMAIER, Ap-
pellant. 
[1] S1Ulersedeas-Stay of Proceedings.-When an action is brought 
in a court of this stllte involving the same parties and 
subject matter as an aetion already pending in a court of 
another jurisdiction, a stay of the California proceeding is 
not a matter of right but within the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and in exercising its discretion the court should 
consider the importance of discouraging multiple litigation 
designed solely to harass an adverse party and of avoiding un. 
seemly conflicts with courts of other jurisdictions, and 
should also consider whether the rights of the parties can best 
be determined by the court of the other jurisdietion bzeause 
of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of wit-
nesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court 
have advanced. 
[2] ld.-Stay of Proeeedings.-In deciding whether the representa-
tion of plaintiff in an action in federal court in another state 
was an adequate substitute for a present determination of its 
rights in a California court, the California court was not bound 
by the federal court's determination that the representation 
was adequate to prevent intervention. 
[3] ld.-Stay of Proceedings.-In an action for declaration of 
plaintiff's rights and duties under the provisions of a patent 
license agreement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying defendant's motion for a stay of proceedings pending 
final judgment in a prior action brought by defendant in 
federal court in another state against plaintiff's assignor for 
an accounting of royalties allegedly due under the license 
where the federal complaint did not call for an adjudication 
of the assignability of the license and plaintiff's rights there-
under, and those issues, because of denial of plaintiff's motion 
to intervene, could not be adjudicated in that court. 
[4] Patents - Actio!l3 - Law Gcverning.-Every action that in-
volves, no matter how incidentally, a United States patent is 
not for that reason governed exclusively by federal Inw, since 
a patent is not granted without reference to the general powers 
the states possess over their domestic affairs. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Supersedeas, § 2; [4-8, 30, 32) 
Patents, §8; [9-13, 15-20, 2~26) Patents, §5; [14] Patents, §1; 
[21-23] Assignments, § 13; [27] Patents, § 7; [28] Patents, § 2; 
[29] Patents, § 9; [31) Appeal and Error, § 1088. 
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[6] ld.-Actions-Jurisdiction.-'An action to set aside, specifically 
enforce or recover royalties on a patent license contract is not 
an action arising under the patent laws of the United States 
for the purpose of determining the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the federal courts; state courts have jurisdiction over such 
actions and, in the absence of diversity of citizenship, it is 
exclusive of the federal courts. 
[6] ld.-Actions-Law Governing.-The elements of plaintiff's 
case in an action to recover royalties on a patent license are 
Dot governed by the patent statutes or by federal decisional 
law evolved to implement such statutes, but arise out of con-
tract and depend on common law and equity principles. 
['1] ld.-Actions-Law Goveming.-The law governing plaintiff's 
case in an action to re~over royalties on a patent license is 
state law, acting of its own force, and not merely by in-
corporation into federal law. 
[8] ld.-Actions-Law Gov3rnine.-Not every issue in an action to 
recover royalties on a patent license, including assignability of 
the license, is necessarily governed by the state law; if the 
policy of the patent laws or Ilome other federal statute re-
quires it, state law must give way. 
[9] ld.-Lillenses-Assignment.-The absence of any specific stat-
utory provision governing assignability of a patent license 
does not in itself mean that federal law does not control, since 
. if the policy of the federal statute or the implications of the 
federal system require a uniform rule of decision, the federal 
courts have paramount power to fashion such rule. 
[10] ld.-Licenses-Assignment.-The existence of a line of fed-
eral cases establishing a rule of construction on the assign-
ability of patent licen3es is no indication of a federal policy . 
excluding state law where those cases involved no conscious 
choice between state and federal law. 
[11] ld.-Licenses-Assignment.-The fact that Congress has ex-
pressly provided for the assignment of patents, thereby making 
some aspects of the validity of such assignments questions of 
federal law, does not show that any federal policy exists to 
control the assignment of rights under a license. 
[12] ld.-Licenses.-Licenses have no statutory basis, and rights 
under them arise from contract rather than from the fact that 
patent rights are involved. 
[18] ld.-Licenses-Assignment.-There is no policy underlying 
the federal patent statutes that requires a uniform federal rule 
of construction of license contracts to determine their assign-
ability. 
[9] See Cal.Jur., Patents, 14; Am.Jur., Patents, 1146 et seq. 
) 
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[14] Id.-Purpose-Law GoverniDg.-The purpose in granting a 
patrnt monopoly is to promote progress in science and the useful 
arts by stimulating invention and encouraging disclosure; so 
long as state law does not destroy the advantages of the 
monopoly, it respects the federal purpose, and there is no 
reason why it should not govern, as with any other property, 
the incidents attached to ownership of the patent. 
[15] Id.-Licenses-Assignment.-The value of a patent is not 
affected by subjecting the patentee to state rules of con-
struction on assignability of licenses; since the patentee must 
in any event look to state law to determine most of his rights 
under the license, no great inconvenience will be involved in 
also ascertaining what the state law is on assignability. 
[16] Id.-Licenses-Assignment.-The value of a patent is not 
significantly affected it the state applies a rule of construction 
favoring assignability; such a rule would not hamper the 
patentee's right to profit from his monopoly .by licensing under 
it. 
[17] Id.-Licenses-Assignment.-Though Congress could legislate 
on the subject of assignability ~f a patent license and thereby 
onst state law, in the absence of such action the state Supreme 
Court will not postulate a policy it cannot find in exist-
ing federal statutes, and if any federal interest exists it is 
too remote and speCUlative to justify displacing state law. 
[18] Id.-Licenses-Assignment.-Although the question of assign-
ability of a patent. license contract is one for determination 
by state law, federal cases are persuasive authority because 
of the experience of federal courts in the area of patents 
and patent licenses. 
[19] Id.-Licenses-Assignment.-It is not necessary or wise to 
establish a fixed rule, peculiar to patent licenses, that such 
contracts are not assignable unless made expressly so; there 
is no reason to exempt these contracts from a general rule 
adapted to facilitate the freest possible transfer of valuable 
contract rights, while at the same time respecting the parties' 
intentions. 
[20] Id.-Licenses-Assignment.-Nothing in the nature of patent 
licenses makes the rights conferred by them necessarily so per-
sonal that the parties must have intended that they be non-
assignable. 
(21] ASsignments - Contractual Interests. - The state statutes 
manifest a policy in favor of free transferability of all 
types of property, including rights under contracts (Civ. Code, 
§§ 954, 1044, 1458), but the terms and purposes of a con-
tract may show,!hat it was intended to be nonassignable. 
[21] See Cal.Jur.2d, Assignments, § 11 et seq.; Am.Jur .. Assign-
lIleDts, § 5 et seq. 
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[22J ld.-Contractual Interests.-The duties imposed on one party 
by a contract may be of such a personal nature that their per-
formance by someone else would in effect deprive the other 
party of that for which he bargained, and in such situation 
they cannot be delegated. 
[23] ld.-Contractual lnterests.-Rights cannot be assigned if the 
assignment would materially impair the nonassigning party's 
chance of obtaining the performance he expected. 
[24] Patents-Licenses-Construction of Agreement.-Where an 
inventor of improvements in agricultural sprinkling apparatus 
entered into a license agreement with a corporation whereby 
the corporation was given the right to make and sell apparatus 
embodying the invention, in return for which it promised to 
pay the inventor a royalty on sums received from licensed 
sales, the inventor's failure to provide against the possibility 
of a controlling stockholder's selling his interest in the cor-
poration was a strong indication that he did not consider per-
sonal control by such stockholder essential, and a provision in 
the contract permitting the corporation to sublicense showed 
that the inventor did not intend to restrict enjoyment of rights 
under the contract to an organization controlled personally 
by such stockholder. 
[25] ld.-Licenses-Assignment.-A provision in a lieense agree-
ment between an inventor and a corporation that the inventor 
could use any improvements on the invention during the 
life of the contract did not invalidate the corporation's assign-
ment of the license where the corporation did not obligate 
itself to make improvements. 
[26] ld.-Licenses-Assignment.-Where an inventor of improve-
ments in agricultural sprinkling apparatus entered into a 
license agreement with a corporation whereby the corpora-
tion was given the right to make and sell apparatus embodying 
the invention and it promised to pay the inventor a royalty on 
sums reeeived from licensed sales, and where the eorporation 
was permitted to grant sublicenses and the inventor retained 
the right to make and sell apparatus embodying the invention 
and, within specified limits, to license others to do so, the 
inventor was not assured of any definite royalty from the 
corporation in the absence of any promise to produce and sell 
a eertain number of sprinkler systems, and plaintiff, as as-
signee of the corporation, was not bound to sell a certain 
number, and if defendant to whom the inventor assigned his 
patent found the royalty returns under the license unsatis-
factory, under the contract he was free, within the limits 
specified, to lic..ense other producers, and the corporation's 
assignment to'plaintiff did not impair materially defendant's 
chance of obtaining the performanee for which the iDventor 
bargained. 
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[27] Id.-Royalty Contracts.-Wbere a license agreement between 
an innntor and a corporation provided that the corporation 
would pay the inventor a designated per cent of all "sums re-
ceived from licensed sales," defined the quoted words as sums 
received by the corporation or a sublicensee from sales or 
leases of apparatus and parts thereof, the manufacture, sale 
or lease of which would infringe any patent right in a "subject 
invention" if this agreement were not in force, and defined 
"subject inventions" as "inventions relating to the adaptation 
of irrigation pipe lines for movement upon wheels secured to 
irrigation pipe couplings and provided with a driving means," 
the corporation's assignee was bound to pay royalties only on 
sums received from sales of wheel and coupling units; the 
corporation was only interested in and willing to pay for the 
right to USe the invention or the right to use what was new and 
constituted progress over apparatus known to the trade, and it 
was not reasonable to interpret the phrase "sums received ••• 
from sales . . . of apparatus and parts thereof" as imposing 
a royalty on the sale of all parts of a sprinkling system if the 
sale of anyone part would infringe the patent. 
[28] Id.-Rights of Inventor-Subjects of Patent.-Improvement 
in one element of a combination, although in a sense it makes 
the combination a new thing, does not produce a patentable 
combination: for the combination to be a patentable invention, 
it must perform a new and different function, and it is Dot 
enough that the improvement merely increases the efficiency 
or convenience of the old combination. 
[29] Id.-Infringement.-Where a licensor's only invention con-
sisted in an improved coupling and such coupling was in-
cluded only in the wheel and coupling units of sprinkling 
apparatus sold by the assignee of a license granting the right 
to make and sell apparatus embodying such invention, all 
other parts of the apparatus on the published price list could 
be soJd without infringing the licensor's patent. 
[30] Id.-Actions-Evidence.-In an action for declaration of 
rights and duties under a patent license which gave a cor-
poration the right to make and sell sprinkling apparatus em-
bodying the licensor's invention and which was allegedly as-
signed to plaintiff after the corporation's dissolution, it was 
proper to permit the principal stockholder of the corporation 
to testify that, before entering into the license contract, he had 
asked counS!"j to make a search to determine if mounting 
pipes on wheels was patentable and that counsel had reported 
the exi5tence of another patent, since such evidence was rele-
vant and competent to show that at the time of execution of 
the contract such stoel,holder probably knew that mounting 
pipes on wheels was not new lind thereby to show his under-
standing of tht;.<.IIature of the licensor's invention and the 
meaning of the royalty provisions. 
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[31J Appeal-Right to Allege Error.-A party who did not request 
that the probative force of evidence introduced by the opposing 
party be confined to a certain issue cannot complain on appeal 
that other inferences could possibly be drawn from it. 
[32] Patents-Actions-Evidence.-In an action for declaration 
of rights and duties under a patent license which gave a cor-
poration the right to make and sell sprinkling apparatus em-
bodying the licensor's invention, it was proper to permit the 
principal stockholder of the corporation to testify that cer-
tain features of the licensor's apparatus had been used by 
such stockholder for some years in other apparatus, where 
such stockholder was familiar with his firm's equipment and 
was in a position to testify as to what features of the lieensor's 
apparatus had been used before the licensor applied for a 
patent. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sac-
ramento County. James H. Oakley, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for declaratory relief. Judgment for plaintiff af-
firmed. 
Wilke, Fleury & Sapunor and Sherman C. Wilke for Ap-
pellant. 
Theodore H. Lassagne and Naylor & Lassagne for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plainti:!i in this action seeks a declaratory 
judgment that it is entitled to manufacture and sell irrigation 
equipment under a patent license agreement and a declaration 
of its duties under the royalty provisions of the license agree· 
ment. 
Darrell C. Mansur invented certain improvements in agri-
eultural sprinkling apparatus. He applied for a patent on 
his invention, and in the autumn of 1949, while his application 
was still pending, entered into negotiations with the Stout 
Irrigation Company, an Oregon corporation (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Stout), for the purpose of licensing Stout to 
manufacture and sell apparatus embodying the invention. 
Stout was represented in these negotiations by William II. 
Stout, its president and controlling shareholder, a man of 
(,onsiderable experience in t.he irrigation equipment business. 
Mansur, William I-I .. Stout, and defendant Dopplmaier were 
nIl present at a ue1{lOnstration of apparatus embodying the 
invention held near Fresno in September. 
) 
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On December 5, 1949, Mansur and Stout entered into the 
license agreement that is the subject of this action. By this 
agreement Stout was given the right to make or have made 
and to sell apparatus embodying Mansur's invention, in return 
for which it promised to pay Mansur a royalty of three per 
cent of sums received from licensed sales. Stout was permitted 
to grant sublicenses on condition that it assume responsibility 
for the payment of all royalties due on sales by its sub-
licensees. Mansur retained the right to make and sell appar-
atus embodying the invention himself and to license others to 
do so, except that he agreed not to sell to manufacturers or 
distributors who were in business on December 5, 1949. Im-
provements in the invention made by either Stout or Mansur 
could be used by the other during the life of the agreement. 
Stout manufactured and sold irrigation apparatus under 
the license until January 31, 1952. On that date the corpo-
ration was dissolved and its assets passed to its shareholders. 
On February 2, 1952, the shareholders sold the assets, includ-
ing choses in action, to plaintiff, a California corporation, 
which proceeded to manufacture and sell under the license. 
Meanwhile Mansur had obtained his patent and assigned it to 
defendant together with his rights under the license. First 
Stout, and later plaintiff, tendered royalties under the license 
to Mansur and defendant, Mansur's assignee. The first 
royalty payment was accepted without protest, but defendant 
rejected later payments on the ground that they were com-
puted on the basis of sums received only from sales of wheel 
and coupling units, whereas the license called for a royalty 
based on SUIns received from sales of the entire irrigation 
apparatus or any of its parts. 
In June, 1951, defendant commenced an action against 
Stout in the United States District Court for the District of 
Oregon for an accounting of royalties allegedly due under 
the license. Plaintiff sought to intervene on the ground that 
it had bound itself to pay any liability adjudged against 
Stout, and that its interests were inadequately represented. It 
also counterclaimed for a declaration of its rights under the 
license as Stout's successor or assignee. The district court 
denied the motion to intervene, and its order was later af-
firmed by the court of appeals on the ground that there was 
no showing that plaintiff was inadequately represented on the 
accounting issue, and that the issue made by the counterclaim 
was not involved iIJ.-the action. (Farmland Irr. 00. v. Doppl-
meier (9th Cir.), 220 F.2d 247.) 
Plaintitf then commenced the present· action. A motion 
) 
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by defendant for a stay of prQceedings pending final judgment 
in the Oregon action was denied. After trial on the merits, 
the court adjudged that the rights granted Stout under the 
license were assignable and had been assigned, through the 
shareholders, to plaintiff, and that under the license plaintiff 
was bound to pay royalties only on sums received from sales 
of wheel and coupling units and not on sums received from 
sales of any other parts of the apparatus. From this judg-
ment defendant appeals. 
We are confronted at the threshold with defendant's con-
tention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion for a stay of proceedings. [1] When an action is 
brought in a court of this state involving the same parties 
and the same subject matter as an action already pending in 
a court of another jurisdiction, a stay of the California pro-
ceedings is not a matter of right, but within the sQund dis-
cretion of the trial court. In exercising its discretion the 
court should consider the importance of discouraging mul-
tiple litigation designed solely to harass an adverse party, 
and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other 
jurisdictions. It should also consider whether the rights of 
the parties can best be determined by the court of the other 
jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter, 
the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the pro-
ceedings in the other court have already advanced. (See 
Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.2d 119, 123-131 [214 
P.2d 844,19 A.L.R.2d 288] ; Pesquera del Pacifico, S. de R. L. 
v. Superior Court, 89 Cal.App.2d 738, 740-741 [201 P.2d 
553].) 
The parties to the present action are not identical with 
those in the Oregon action. Plaintiff is not a party to the 
Oregon action; it attempted to intervene as a party defend-
ant, but was successfully prevented from doing 80 by 
defendant. Plaintiff brought the present action, not to harass 
defendant with mUltiple litigation, but to assert interests it 
claimed would not be adequately represented in the Oregon 
action. Defendant contends that nevertheless plaintiff should 
be compelled to await and be bound by the outcome of the 
Oregon action. [2] In deciding whether the representation 
of plaintiff in the Oregon action was an adequate substitute 
for a present determination of its rights in a California court, 
the trial court was not bound by the federal court's determina-
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[3] Moreover, all the issues in the present action are not 
involved in the Oregon action. (C/. Pesqucra del Pacifico, S. 
de R.L. v. Superior Court, 89 Cal.App.2d 738, 741 [201 P.2d 
553].) Although the complaint in the Oregon action calls for 
an adjudication of the licensee's obligations under the royalty 
provisions, the issue raised by plaintiff's second cause of action 
in the present case, it does not call for an adjudication of the 
assignability of the license and plaintiff's rights thereunder, 
the issues raised by plaintiff's first cause of action. Plaintiff 
sought to present these issues to the federal court in its counter-
claim, but because the motion to intervene was denied, they will 
not be adjudicated in that court. A stay of the present proceed-
ings would therefore not only bring these issues no closer to 
determination, but would compel plaintiff to await a judgment 
that cannot respond to its need. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying a stay that would have such an 
effect. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding 
that Stout's rights under the license were assignable and 
had been assigned to plaintiff. Rights under a patent license. 
defendant argues, are not assignable unless express consent 
to assignment is contained in the license contract, and in the 
absence of sueh consent the contract must be construed as 
conferring purely personal, nontransferable rights. This rule 
of construction appears to be set forth in a line of federal 
cases of which the principal case is Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 
U.S. 226 [7 8. Ct. 193, 30 L.Ed. 369]. 
It is contended that because a United States patent is 
the creature of a federal statute and can be assigned only 
in the manner provided by federal law, the assignability of 
rights under a patent license is also a federal question and in 
the absence of statutory provision is to be determined by the 
decisional law of the federal courts. This reasoning fails to 
distinguish patent rights, whuse assignability is admittedly 
governed by a specific statutory provision (35 U.S.C. § 261), 
and rights created by a contract whose subject is exemption 
from a patent monopoly. It misconceives the policy of the 
federal patent statute and the relation between federal and 
state law in the area of patent rights. 
[4] Every action that involves, no matter how incidentally, 
a United States patent is not for that reason governed exclu-
sively by federal law. The police power of the states, for 
example, has long been held to include reasonable regulation 
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to public safety (Patterson v. l(entucky, 97 U.S. 501, 503· 
509 [24 L.Ed. 1115]), and regulation of the transfer of patent 
rights to prevent fraud. (Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347, 355-
357 [27 S.Ct. 95, 51 L.Ed. 216].) A patent is not granted 
without reference to the general powers the states possess over 
their domestic affairs. 
[5] It has been established by a long line of cases, more-
over, that an action to set aside, specifically enforce, or 
recover royalties on a patent license contract is not an action 
arising under the patent laws of the United States for the 
purpose of determining the exclusive jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts. (Wilson v. Sandford, 10 How. (U.S.) 99,101 [13 
L.Ed. 344] ; Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613, 616-620 [1 s.et. 
550,27 L.Ed. 295] ; Dale Tile Mfg. 00. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46, 
51-54 [8 S.Ct. 756, 31 L.Ed. 683] ; Pratt v. Paris Gas Light 
&: Ooke 00., 168 U.S. 255, 257-260 [18 S.Ct. 62,42 L.Ed. 458] ; 
Excelsior Wooden Pipe 00. v. Pacific Bridge 00., 185 U.S. 
282, 285·287 [22 S.Ct. 681, 46 L.Ed. 910]; New Marshall 
Engine 00. v. Marshall Engine 00., 223 U.S. 473 [32 S.Ct. 
238, 56 L.Ed. 513] ; Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 
502-511 [46 S.Ct. 397, 70 L.Ed. 703]; Becher v. Oontoure 
Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391 [49 S.Ct. 356, 73 L.Ed. 
752]; Pendleton v. Ferguson, 15 Cal.2d 319, 326-327 [101 
P.2d 81, 688].) State courts have jurisdiction over such 
actions, and in the absence of diversity of citizenship it is 
exclusive of the federal courts. (See Henry v. A. B. Dick 00., 
224 U.S. 1, 14-15 [36 S.Ct. 364, 56 L.Ed. 645]; Dale Tile 
Mfg. 00. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46, 53 [8 S.Ct. 756, 31 L.Ed. 
683]. ) 
[6] These authorities were concerned with whether a case 
was one" arising under the patent laws" within the meaning 
of the federal jurisdictional statutes and the federal policy 
apportioning business between state and federal courts. Nev-
ertheless, since the jurisdictional test they established was 
tied to the law that created the cause of action stated in the 
complaint and made the source of that law its operative fact 
(see American Well Works 00. v. Layne &: Bowler 00., 241 
U.S. 257, 259-260 [36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed. 987] ; Albright v. 
Teas, 106 U.S. 613, 616-618 [1 S.Ct. 550, 27 L.Ed. 295]), 
in holding that federal jurisdiction did not exist, they neces-
sarily held that the patent statutes did not govern the elements 
of the plaintiff's case. 
Nor were the elements of the plaintiff's case -governed 
bv federal decisimial law evolved to implement the patent 
) 
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statutes, for a ease founded on such law would have arisen 
under the patent laws for jurisdictional purposes as much as 
an action for infringement. As stated in Wilson v. Sanford, 
10 How. (U.S.) 99, 101-102 [13 L.Ed. 344], "the dispute in 
this case does not arise Under any act of Congress; nor does 
the decision depend upon the construction of any law in 
relation to patents. It arises out of the contract stated in the 
bill; and there is no act of Congress providing for or regulat-
ing contracts of this kind. The rights of the parties depend 
altogether upon common law and equity principles." The 
absence of any elements of distinctively federal law, statutory 
or decisional, in the plaintiff's ease was emphasized by eases 
holding that, absent a question of the validity or scope of the 
patent itself, there was no jurisdiction in the United States 
Supreme Court to review state court decisions on patent 
licenses. (Marsh v. Nichols, Shepard ~ Co., 140 U.S. 344, 
354-357 [11 S.Ct. 798, 35 L.Ed. 413] ; Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. 
Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46,53 [8 8.Ct. 756, 31 L.Ed. 683].) 
The plaintiff's cause of action arose under and was gov-
erned by the general common law of contracts. If the 
action was in a federal court, the court applied its view of 
the common law independent of state court determinations. 
The question was not posed whether the governing law was 
specifically state law and whether the law of a particular 
state should be applied. In this judicial climate, the decisions 
were rendered that defendant relies on as establishing a fed-
eral rule in respect to assignments of licenses. [7] In the 
light of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 [58 8.Ct. 817,82 
L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487], the law governing the elements 
of the plaintiff's cause of action is state law-state law acting 
of its own force and not merely by incorporation into federal 
law. The language of Mr. Justice Holmes in American Well 
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 [368.Ct. 
585, 60 L.Ed. 987], a case involving an action for libel and 
slander of the plaintiff's title to a machine the defendant 
claimed infringed his patent, is appropriate: "But whether it 
is a wrong or not depends upon the law of the State where the 
act is done, not upon the patent law, and therefore the suit 
arises under the law of the State. A suit arises under the 
law that creates the cause of action .... The State is master 
of the whole matter, and if it saw fit to do away with actions 
of this type altogether, no one, we imagine, would suppose 
that they still co~ld be maintained under the patent laws of 
the United StateS." (See also S1mnen v. Commissioner of 
) 
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Int. Rev., (8th Cir.) 161 F.2d 171,175, rev'd on other 
grounds, 333 U.S. 591 [68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898]; American 
Machine &: Metals, Inc. v. De Bothezat Impeller Co. (S.D. 
N.Y.), 82 F.Supp. 556, 558, afi'd (2d Cir.) , 180 F.2d 342, 
348, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 979 [70 S.Ct.1025, 94 L.Ed. 1383].) 
This conclusion does not, however, completely dispose of 
the problem. [8] Even if state law governs the basic ele-
ments of the plaintiff's case in an action to recover royalties 
on a license, it does not follow that every issue in the case, 
including the assignability of the license, is governed by state 
law. (See Pratt v. Paris Gas Light &: Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 
259-260 [18 S.Ct. 62, 42 L.Ed. 458] ; Albright v. Teas, 106 
U.S. 613, 616-618 [1 S.Ct. 550, 27 L.Ed. 295].) If the policy 
of the patent laws or some other federal statute requires it, 
state law must of course give way. (C/. Scott Paper Co. v. 
Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 254-257 [66 S.Ct. 101, 90 . 
L.Ed. 47]; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 
U.S. 173, 175 [63 S.Ct. 172,87 L.Ed. 1651.) [9] Moreover, 
the absence of any specific statutory provision governing the 
issue does not in itself mean that federal law does not control, 
for if the policy of the federal statute or the implications of 
the federal system require a uniform rule of decision, the 
federal courts have paramount power to fashion such a rule. 
(See D'Oench, Duhme 47 Co. v .. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 
315 U.S. 447, 456-458 [62 S.Ct. 676, 86 L.Ed. 956], and see 
Mr. Justice Jackson concurring at 469-475; Interaction of 
National and State-Created Interests in Non-Diversity Fields, 
47 Columb.L.Rev. 629.) 
[10] On the other hand, the existence of a line of federal 
cases establishing a rule of construction on the assignability 
of licenses is no indication of a federal policy excluding state 
law. These cases came, for the most part, before Erie R. R. v. 
Tompkins, and therefore involved no conscious choice between 
state and federal law. The federal cases since Erie R. R. v. 
Tompkins, do not state what law· governs the issue (e. g., 
Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp. v. Filben Mfg. Co. (8th Cir.), 168 F.2d 
919, 922, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 892 [69 S.Ct. 249, 93 L.Ed. 
430]), and decisions from the state courts have been equally 
unenlightening on the applicable law. (Scltlesinger v. Regen-
streif, 135 N.Y.S.2d 858, 862-863; Paper Producis Machine 
Co. v. Safepack Mills, 239 Mass. 114 [131 N.E. 288].) 
[11] The fact that Congress has expressly provided fC?r the 
assignment of pate)lts themselves (35 U.S.C. § 261), and there-
by made some aspects of the validity of such assignments 
) 
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questions of federal law (see Orown Die &- Tool 00. v. Nye 
Tool &- Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24 [43 S.Ct. 254, 67 L.Ed. 
516]; McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories 00. (3d 
Cir.) , 138 F.2d 493), also does not show that any federal 
policy exists to control the assignment of rights under a 
license. [12] Licenses have no statutory basis, and rights 
under them arise from contract rather than from the fact that 
patent rights are involved. (See Ellis, Patent Assignments 
and Licenses 229 (1936). ) 
[13] We can find no policy underlying the federal patent 
statutes that requires a uniform federal rule of construction 
of license contracts to determine their assignability. [14] The 
purpose in granting a patent monopoly is to promote progress 
in science and the useful arts by stimUlating invention and 
encouraging disclosure. So long as state law does not destroy 
the advantages of the monopoly, it respects the federal pur-
pose, and there is no reason why it should not govern, as 
with any other property, the incidents attached to the owner-
ship of the patent. As was said in Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 
U.S. 501, 508-509 [24 L.Ed. 1115], "There is no need of giving 
this power [of monopoly] any broader construction in order 
to attain the end for which it was granted, which was to 
re,vard the benencent efforts of genius, and to encourage the 
useful arts." 
[15] The value of the patent is not affected by subjecting 
the patentee to state rules of construction on assignability of 
licenses. Since it is clear that the patentee must in any event 
look to state law to determine most of his rights under the 
license, no great inconvenience will be involved in also ascer-
taining what the state law is on assignability. [16] Also, the 
value of the patent is not significantly affected if the state 
applies a rule of construction favoring assignability. Such a 
rule would not hamper the patentee's right to profit from his 
monopoly by licensing under it. 
[17] It may be that Congress could legislate on this subject 
and thereby oust state law (see Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347, 
356 [27 S.Ct. 95, 51 L.Ed. 216]), but in the absence of such 
action we will not postulate a policy we cannot nnd in the 
existing federal statutes. If any federal interest exists, it 
is too remote and speculative to justify displacing state law. 
(See Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 [77 S.Ct. 119, 
121, 1 L.Ed.2d 93].) We conclude, therefore, that we are 
free to make our owp"determination whether the assignability 
of a license contraSt requires express consent in the contract. 
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[18] Although the question is one for determination by the 
law of this state, federal caseS are of course persuasive author-
ity because of the experienbe of the federal courts in the 
area of patents and patent licenses. The authoritative federal 
statement that a patent license is not assignable unless made 
expressly so is contained in Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 
233-234 [7 S.Ct. 193, 30 L.Ed. 36'9]. The court stated that the 
license was purely personal and was extinguished with the 
dissolution of the corporate licensee, although it pointed to 
no peculiarly personal rights involved. The court relied on 
the earlier cases of Troy Iron &7 Nail Factory v. Corning, 
14 How. (U.S.) 193, 216 [14 L.Ed. 383], and Oliver F. tf C. 
Co. v. Rumford Chemical Works, 109 U.S. 75, 82 [3 S.Ct. 61, 
27 L.Ed. 862]. The statement in the Troy case, however, 
was not necessary to the decision, and in Oliver F. tf C. Co. v. 
Rumford Chemical Works there were provisions in the license 
calling for the exercise of the perS()nal skill of the licensee 
that would have restricted transfer of rights under the license 
even under ordinary rules of eonstruction. In Providence 
Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 788, 799 [19 L.Ed. 
566], another case before Hapgood v. Hewitt, the court found 
the licensee's rights personal and nonassignable only after 
examining the terms of the instrument and the testimony in 
the record to ascertain the true meaning and purpose of 
the contract. (See also Putnam v. Hollender, (C.C. S.D. 
N.Y.) 6 F. 882,890-892.) 
Many of the cases since Hapgood v. Hewitt can be explained 
on the ground that language in the instrument or the purposes 
of the contract clearly excluded assignability (e.g., Rock-Ola 
Mfg. Corp. v. Filben Mfg. Co., (8th Cir.) 168 F.2d 919, 922, 
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 892 [69 S.Ct. 249, 93 L.Ed. 430]; 
Reynolds Spring 00. v. L. A. Young Industries, Inc., (6th 
Cir.) 101 F.2d 257, 260; Lanahan v. OLark Oar 00., (3d Cir.) 
11 F.2d 820, 823; Niagara Fire Extinguisher 00. v. Hibbard, 
(7th Cir.) 179 F. 844, 845 [103 C.C.A. 330), but neverthe-
less the rule of Hapgood v. Hewitt appears to have been 
consistently adhered to by the federal courts, although without 
any satisfactory explanation of the reasons underlying it. 
(See Lane &- Bodley 00. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193, 195-196 [14 
S.Ct. 78, 37 hEd. 1049J: Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument 
00. (W. D. Mich.) 63 F.Supp. 591, 593, rev'd on other 
grounds (6th Cir.}, 160 F.2n R78: Neon Signal De·uice.s. Inc. v. 
A.lpha-01Q1Jde Neon Om·p. ,\V.D. Pa.), 54 F.2c1 793, 796; 
Bowers v. Lake Superior Oont. & Dredging 00. (8th Cir.), 149 
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F. 983, 986 [79 C.C.A. 493].) The only exception is when 
the transferee succeeds to the entire business of the licensee, 
and assumes all its assets and liabilities. (Lane &7 Bodley 
Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193,196 [14 8.Ct. 78, 37 L.Ed. 1049].) 
We are not persuaded that the United States Supreme Court 
would, in view of the modern tendency in favor of assign-
ability, adhere today to the rule it laid down in Hapgood v. 
Hewitt. [19] Furthermore, we do not find it necessary or 
wise to establish a fixed rule, peculiar to patent licenses, that 
such contracts are not assignable unless made expressly so. 
There is no reason to exempt these contracts from a general 
rule adapted to facilitate the freest possible transfer of 
valuable contract rights, while at the same time respecting 
the parties' intentions. The federal eases have relied on the 
flat statement that a license creates a merely personal right. 
This statement should follow as a conclusion from an exami-
nation of the purposes and provisions of the particular license, 
rather than stand as a self-evident first principle. [20] Noth-
ing in the nature of patent licenses makes the rights conferred 
by them necessarily so personal that the parties must have in-
tended that they be nonassignable. 
[21] The statutes in this state clearly manifest a policy 
in favor of the free transferability of all types of property, 
including rights under contracts. (Civ. Code, §§ 954, 1044, 
1458.) The terms and purpose of a contract may show 
however, that it was intended to be nonassignable. [22] Thus 
the duties imposed upon one party may be of such a personal 
nature that their performance by someone else would in effect 
deprive the other party of that for which he bargained. The 
duties in such a situation cannot be delegated. (See La Rue v. 
Groezinger, 84 Cal. 281, 283-285 [24 P. 42, 18 Am.St.Rep. 
179].) [23] Rights likewise cannot be assigned if the assign-
ment would materially impair the nonassigning party's chance 
of obtaining the performance he expected. (See 2 Williston, 
Contracts, 1177-1182 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 Rest., Contracts, § 151 
(1932).) 
Defendant contends that if these principles are applied 
to the license in the present case, the licensee's rights were 
not assignable. His argument is that Mansur bargained for 
William H. Stout's experience in manufacturing and selling 
irrigation equipment, and intended that rights under the 
license should be exereised only by a corporation controll<>d 
by him; that if the~e -rights may be exercised by another, the 
, 
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value of defendant's right to receive royalties will be less 
than was bargained for. 
[24] There is no express provision in the contract against 
assignment. Furthermore, nothing in the contract or the sur-
rounding circumstances shows that rights under it were in- i 
tended to be nonassignable. As the trial court pointed out, . 
since Mansur did not testify and since apart from the instru-
ment there was no evidence of his intentions, it was the barest 
speculation to say that personal performance by William H. 
Stout was an important inducement for him. The provision 
in the contract permitting the corporation to sublicense shows 
that Mansur did not intend to restrict enjoyment of rights 
under the contract to an organization controlled personally 
by William H. Stout. It is true that at the time the contract 
was entered into William H. Stout owned a controlling inter-
est in Stout. The contract was made, however, with a corpo-
ration, and a corporation by nature may change both· in 
ownership and the agents through whom it acts. If William 
H. Stout had simply sold his stock in the corporation, defend-
ant could surely not contend that the corporation's rights 
under the license would be extinguished. Since Mansur dealt 
with a corporation, if he thought that control of the corpora-
tion by a particular person was essential to assure an advan-
tageous return of royalties, he would have provided against 
the possibility of that person's selling his interest. Mansur's 
failure to do so is a strong indication that he did not consider 
personal control by William H. Stout essential. (See Haldor, 
Inc. v. Beebe, 72 Cal.App.2d 357, 365 [164 P.2d 568].) 
[25] Defendant points to the provision in the contract that 
if Stout makes any improvements on the invention, Mansur 
may use them during the life of the contract, and argues that 
Stout's interest in making such improvements is destroyed by 
assigning its rights. Stout did not, however, obligate itself 
to make improvements (see Fenn v. Pickwick Corp., 117 Cal. 
App. 236, 240 [4 P.2d 215]), and, furthermore, if this provi-
sion invalidates Stout's assigi,nnent to plaintiff, the similar 
provision that Stout may use Mansur's improvements invali-
dates Mansur's assignment to defendant. [26] Finally, Man-
sur was not assured of any definite royalty from Stout, for 
Stout did not bind itself to produce and sell a certain number 
of sprinkler systems, and plaintiff as assignee is not bound to 
sell a certain number. If defendant finds the royalty returns 
under the license unsatisfactory, under the contract he is 
free, within limits, to llcense other producers. The assignment 
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did not impair materially defendant's chance of obtaining the 
performance for which Mansur bargained, and therefore it was 
effective to transfer Stout's rights to plaintiff. 
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in its 
determination of the method of computing royalties under 
the license. The license provided that Stout would pay 
Mansur three per cent of all "sums received from licensed 
sales." "Sums received from licensed sales" was defined 
as-sums received by Stout or any sublicensee of Stout here-
under, from sales or leases of apparatus and parts thereof, 
the manufacture or sale or lease of which apparatus would 
infringe any patent right of Mansur in a subject invention 
if this agreement were not in force. . . . 
"SUbject inventions" was defined as-inventions relating 
to the adaptation of irrigation pipe lines for movement upon 
wheels secured to irrigation pipe couplings and provided with 
a driving means, which inventions are disclosed and claimed 
in a patent or a pending application now or hereafter filed 
by or in behalf of Mansur and based upon a sole or joint 
invention of Mansur, or as to which patent or pending applica-
tion Mansur has or may acquire any right to grant a license 
during the existence of this agreement. 
Defendant's contention is that these provisions require the 
payment of a royalty of three per cent of all sums received 
from the sale of sprinkling systems embodying Mansur's in-
vention, or any part of such systems, even if the invention 
consists only in the improvement of one part of the apparatus 
and not in the whole combination. Stout's published price 
list of the parts it sold includes wheel and coupling units, 
aluminum pipes, sprinklers, driving devices for rolling the 
apparatus, hoses, and many other parts that make up an entire 
sprinkling system. Defendant contends that a royalty is due 
on sums received from sales of any of these parts for use in a 
system embodying Mansur's invention, and not, as the trial 
court held, only on sums received from sales of wheel and 
coupling units. 
[27] The contract is not a model of clarity, but we think 
it is evident that what Stout was interested in and willing 
to pay for was the right to use Mansur's invention, that is, 
the right to use what was new and constituted progress over 
apparatus already known to the trade. The first paragraphs 
in the agreement state that Stout desires to manufacture 
apparatus embodying certain improvements, that these im-
proVe!IlA!IIliJI wer~>.embodied in apparatus demonstrated toO the 
) 
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parties, and that Mansur is the inventor of these improvements. 
It seems highly improbable that Stout would agree to pay 
royalties on parts long known, and which it had until the time 
of the license sold royalty free. The provision defining sums 
received from licensed sales provides in effect that a royalty 
is due on sums received from sales that would, in the absence 
of the license, infringe Mansur's patent. The computation of 
royalties is tied directly to the test of infringement, and to 
the determination of what was in fact Mansur's invention. 
Defendant places great emphasis on the phrase: "sums 
received . . . from sales . . . of apparatus and parts there-
of. • . ." This phrase does not remove the necessity of 
determining whether the sale of specific apparatus would in 
fact infringe the patent; if it would infringe it, then a royalty 
is due on the sale of that piece of apparatus, or any part of it. 
It is not a reasonable interpretation of this phrase that it 
imposes a royalty on the sale of all parts of a sprinkling 
system if the sale of anyone part would infringe the patent. 
It becomes necessary, therefore, in order to determine what 
sales would .. infringe any patent right of Mansur in a subject 
invention," to know what Mansur invented, and the extent 
to which he advanced over prior art. 
Mansur's claims describe an apparatus in which sections 
of pipe are arranged end to end, each section of pipe joined 
to the next one by a coupling. The coupling is secured to 
the end of one section of pipe, and the end of the abutting 
section of pipe is then inserted into the coupling through an 
opening considerably larger than the diameter of the pipe 
so inserted, and also through a flexible, water-tight seal inside 
the coupling. Because of the size of the opening and the 
flexibility of the water-tight seal, the sections of pipe so 
coupled can assume angles relative to each other. Further-
more, a collar mounted on the inserted pipe section carries 
two projecting arms that fit between ribs on the outside of 
the coupling. These arms do not interfere with the pipe sec-
tions' assuming angles "relative to each other, but assure 
that rotational force applied to one pipe section will be 
transmitted through the coupling to a connected pipe section, 
and then to the whole series of connected pipe sections. A 
wheel is mounted on each coupling; since the wheel is rigidly 
mounted and uses the sleeve of the coupling and the pipe as 
ita hub, rotation of the pipe causes rotation oj the wheel. 
Thus an entire line, of pipes can be rolled from place to place 
.~ 
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with little effort, and without regard to unevenness in the 
terrain. Water is pumped into one end of the line of pipes 
and discharged through sprinklers set in the tops of the pipe 
sections onto the crops to be irrigated. 
As early as 1868, Abbott (British Patent No. 3,416) in-
vented a sprinkling apparatus composed of a series of con-
nected perforated tubes mounted on wheels. The wheels, 
however, were not rigidly mounted on the tubes, but instead 
used them as axles, so that the tubes did not themselves rotate, 
and there was no need to transmit rotational force from one 
tube to the next. Meyer went a step further. (British Patent 
No. 157,727 (1921).) He patented an apparatus in which 
wheels were mounted rigidly on connected pipes, so that 
rotation of the pipes caused rotation of the wheels, and. 
because the sections of pipe were rigidly coupled, rotational 
force applied to anyone section of pipe was transmitted to 
all. It does not appear, however, that the coupling between 
the pipe sections permitted them to assume angles relative 
to each other. Iverson's apparatus (United States Patent No. 
1,373,660 (1921» was similar to Meyer's, and like it made no 
provision for a coupling that would permit pipe sections to 
assume angles relative to each other. Lanninger's apparatus 
(German Patent No. 425,774 (1924» did include a coupling 
that permitted the pipe sections to assume angles relative to 
each other, so that a line of pipe sections could roll easily over 
uneven terrain, but because the pipes did not rotate with the 
wheels, no provision was made for transmitting rotational 
force through the couplings. 
An examination of these earlier patents shows that for some 
time before Mansur's invention, irrigation pipes had been 
equipped with sprinklers, coupled together, and mounted on 
wheels. Moreover, couplings had been devised that permitted 
the pipe sections to assume angles relative to each other, and 
other couplings had been devised that transmitted rotational 
force from one pipe section to all others. It remained for 
Mansur to invent a coupling that performed both these 
functions, and in this innovation, rather than in any combi-
nation of coupled pipes mounted on wheels, he advanced over 
prior art. Agren (United States Patent No. 2,148,975 (1939» 
had also devised a coupling that transmitted rotational force 
and yet permitted connected shafts to move out of straight 
alignment, but the coupling was not adapted for irrigation 
purposes and was ~ni1icantly di1ferent in design· from 
Kansur'.. ,0./ 
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[28] Improvement in one element of a combination, al-
though in a sense it makes the combination a new thing, does 
not produce a patentable combination. For thE' combination 
to be a patentable invention, it must perforrJ a new and 
different function, and it is not enough that the improvement 
merely increases the efficiency or convenience of the old com-
bination. (General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co. (6th 
Cir.), 203 F.2d 912, 917, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 822 [74 S.Ot. 
37, 98 L.Ed. 348].) [29] Since Mansur's only invention 
consisted in an improved coupling, and since this coupling is 
included only in the wheel and coupling units sold by plain-
tiff, all other parts on the published price list can be sold 
without infringing Mansur's patent. The trial court wa!': 
correct in concluding that plaintiff was bound to pay royalties 
only on sums received from sales of wheel and coupling units. 
Defendant's final contention is that the court committed 
errors in admitting certain evidence. We need not consider 
the assignments of error concerning the admission of evidence 
to show that plaintiff is the successor in business of Stout. 
Since we have concluded that plaintiff took its rights under 
the license by assignment, it is unnecessary to decide whether 
it also took as a successor to Stout. 
[80] Defendant contends that it was error to permit Wil-
liam H. Stout to testify that before entering into the contract 
he had asked counsel to make a search to determine if mount-
ing pipes on wheels was patentable and that counsel had 
reported the existence of the Iverson patent. Defendant 
claims that this testimony was immaterial, hearsay, and opin-
ion evidence. The evidence was relevant and competent to 
show that at the time of the execution of the contract William 
H. Stout probably knew that mounting pipes on wheels was 
not new and thereby to show his understanding of the nature 
of Mansur's invention and the meaning of the royalty pro-
VlSIOns. [81] Defendant did not request that the probative 
force of the evidence be confined to this issue and cannot now 
complain that other inferences could possibly be drawn 
from it. 
[82] William H. Stout was also allowed, over defendant's 
objection, to testify that certain features of Mansur's appar-
atus had been used by Stout for some years in other apparatus. 
There was no error here. Stout was admittedly familiar with 
irrigation equipment, in particular with his own firm's equip-
ment, and he w!1s'in a position to testify as to what -features 
of Mansur '8 apparatus had been used before Mansur applied 
) 
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for a patent. He did not give an opinion on what part of 
Mansur's apparatus was new art, the ultimate question of law. 
and his testimony was proper in aiel of the r.onrt's determina-
tion of this issue. (See Smith v. 7'hompson (S.D. Ca1.), 43 F. 
Supp. 848, 849.) 
Judgment affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and :McComb, J., concurred. 
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